The port explosion in Beirut, Lebanon on 4th August 2020 has had devastating impacts on a population that was already facing a humanitarian crisis, socio-political turmoil after a severe economic downturn as well the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Hodzic, 2020) Among the most affected are vulnerable refugees and migrants (particularly those who are unregistered or undocumented) living in Lebanon, many of whom were already living in poverty, with high unemployment, limited access to formal employment opportunities, inadequate shelter and food and limited access to healthcare services. (Koffman, 2020; UNOCHA, 2020; Berkawi, 2020) The proportion of refugees living in extreme poverty had already increased to 75%, with many destitute. (UNHCR, 2020b) There are an estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees (of whom 880,414 are registered with the UNHCR, 23.5% of whom are registered in Beirut), over 475,000 Palestinian refugees (including around 45,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria) and over 250,000 migrant workers in Lebanon, many of whom are migrant domestic workers. (UNHCR, 2020a) With 1 in 4 people in Lebanon considered refugees, Lebanon has the highest refugee ratio per capita anywhere in the world and Syrian refugees in Lebanon already faced numerous challenges with regards to shelter, employment, education and healthcare before this explosion.

It is estimated that at least 43 of the more than 200 who died in the blast were Syrian and 124 other Syrians have been injured including 20 with serious injuries. (UNCHR, 2020c) However, these figures may be higher due to the large proportion of unregistered Syrians in Lebanon, many of whom were living and working in the port area. (Ibrahim, 2020; Georgy & Francis, 2020; Adams, 2020) According to UNHCR, the number of refugees within 2.5 km of the blast was 14,600, those within 5.0 km were 125,600. (UNHCR, 2020) The immediate impacts of the blast on physical and psychosocial health are likely to be exacerbated by the secondary impacts of the blast including destroyed accommodation and loss of livelihoods, a shattered economy and poor healthcare access. For the large proportion of refugees who are currently unregistered, longer term consequences are yet to be realised however they may include increased socio-political tensions with further scapegoating of refugees or calls for forced return to Syria. (Hodzic, 2020) There have also been concerns raised around burying Syrians who died in Lebanon or returning them to Syria. (BBC, 2020)

The Lebanese population is increasingly desperate as a result of the explosion as well as the other recent economic and political insults; as such, there is increasing competition for humanitarian aid and funding. Humanitarian organizations in Lebanon rapidly diverted efforts to support all those affected by the explosion. Though some may have received increased funding, valuable resources (both human and financial) could be diverted away from the already underfunded projects which support refugees, migrants and vulnerable host communities. This could have secondary consequences on projects focused on health, psychosocial programs, protection, nutrition, shelter and employment. The politicisation of aid and rampant corruption within the Lebanese system will undermine trust and funding efforts from outside government donors and aid agencies. Added this is a banking crisis which prevents people from withdrawing much needed funds particularly in US dollars. There is also potential for a reduction in remittances from Lebanese expatriates which account for 12.5% of Lebanon’s GDP. (Koffman, 2020). 

Beirut’s port is a key entry point for imported goods including humanitarian aid and food, of which Lebanon imports around 80%. It is likely that the explosion may send prices for essential items even higher and out-of-the reach of large proportions of the population, particularly the most vulnerable. (Kimball et al. 2020; UNHCR, 2020). The port was also essential for the entry of supplies destined for Syria and was used by the UN and other humanitarian organisations; these organisations are now trying to find alternative supply chains to meet the needs of the 11 million inside Syria who rely on humanitarian aid. (Kimball et al., 2020) Though there is potential to use the port in Tripoli, this port has a much smaller capacity than the Beirut port limiting imports.

The effects of politics or fears of corruption could also undermine funding efforts both from governments and institutions as well as private donors. After the explosion, the Lebanese Cabinet declared a two-week state of emergency which extended powers to the army with potential to crack down on protestors or those who criticise the government. (Chehayeb & Specia, 2020). Lebanon’s parliament subsequently approved this measure raising concerns about the use of curfews, media censorship, banning of mass gatherings and the trials of civilians in military courts.

Government rhetoric in Lebanon had also increasingly turned towards the return of refugees to Syria with concerns regarding forced returns.. The Ministry of Social Affairs has already outlined plans for the mass return of Syrians in liaison with the Syrian government with forced returns reported by Human Rights Watch since April 2019. (Hodzic, 2020; HRW, 2019) In addition to the deportation of Syrians, since early 2019 the Lebanese government has adopted a policy of there has been demolition of refugee shelters, and a crackdown on Syrians working without permits. (HRW, 2020) Although this is illegal under international law, there is potential for Lebanese politicians to reinforce the narrative against refugees at this time of political turmoil. The repatriation of Syrian or Palestinian refugees from Syria who had fled Syria’s protracted conflict and who may be wanted by the Syrian government,and may be wanted by the Syrian government could put some at risk of  could result in arbitrary arrestforced disappearances, torture or , forced conscription or extortion.(Sawa for Dev and aid, 2019)  These coercive measures exist on a background of increasingly negative  xenophobic rhetoric and policies by Lebanese politicians towards Syrian refugees, which have only increased following the onset of the economic crisis, COVID-19 pandemic and now the Beirut blast. This leaves Syrian refugees in Lebanon even more vulnerable. 

Filters: Beirut Blast, Refugees, COVID-19

Contributors

[1] Syria Public Health Network, UK

[2] Johns Hopkins, School of Public Health, USA

[3] Lancet Migration & UCL Institute of Public Health, UK

[4] R4HC – Research for Health in Conflict Collaboration, UK

[5] University of Cambridge, UK

[6] American University of Beirut, Lebanon

References

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BBC Arabic (2020.) https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-53736378

Berkawi, B. (2020, August 20). ‘Bad to worse’: Beirut blast final blow for Lebanon’s trapped migrants. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/lebanon-crisis-migrants/bad-to-worse-beirut-blast-final-blow-for-lebanons-trapped-migrants-idUSL8N2FM1SC

Chehayeb, K. & Specia, M. (2020, August 13). Lebanon’s Parliament Confirms State of Emergency, Extending Army Power. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/world/middleeast/lebanon-parliament-emergency.html

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